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Abstract
We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed
agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coor-
dination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount
of monitoring. Equity like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when principals are able to
coordinate monitoring or verify each others monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free
riding in monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that ßat payments, debt-like contracts
and very low levels of monitoring appear. Free riding may be so strong that there may even be less
monitoring than if the principals cooperated with each other, which shows that non-cooperative
monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessive monitoring.
Key words: monitoring; common agency; costly state veriÞcation.
JEL classiÞcation: D2, D8, G2, G3.
1 Introduction
It is not uncommon to Þnd situations where several principals monitor a common agent: a worker
may have multiple supervisors, a bank may have multiple regulators, a Þrm may borrow from
different banks, and individuals are taxed by multiple authorities. Our focus here is on contexts
where multiple principals attempt to obtain income from a privately informed agent, such as in
the case of multiple Þnanciers. While this problem of costly repayment enforcement has been
widely studied in the case of one principal and one agent1, little attention has been paid so far to
the strategic interactions between multiple principals arising in those environments.
Consider the case of multiple Þnanciers engaged in an income division game with a common
agent. In our model, principals can use two instruments to extract the returns of a project. They
can monitor the agent and they can demand a transfer from the agent. Monitoring comprises of
all the costly instruments aimed at obtaining income from the agent once it is realized, like certi-
Þcation of balance sheets, supervision, shareholders taking legal actions, etc. When coordination
problems between principals are not severe so that monitoring can be centralized, there is excessive
monitoring compared to when the Þnanciers cooperate, and proÞt-sharing schemes (or equity-like
contracts) are optimal. If coordination problems are severe such that Þnanciers choose their moni-
toring efforts independently, free riding in monitoring efforts reduces the incentive to monitor and
it is optimal not to monitor high proÞt levels. That is, the repayment is non-contingent on proÞt
when proÞt levels are high and contracts have debt-like features. Furthermore, free riding may be
so strong that there may even be less monitoring compared to when the Þnanciers fully cooperate
and merge as one. Therefore, we show that noncooperative contracting does not necessarily lead
to excessive monitoring.
In some environments, monitoring activities are coordinated, while in others they are not. For
example, in publicly-traded companies there are many providers of funds and there might also
be different classes of security holders, but there is also in place a set of rules and institutions
(auditors, bankruptcy courts, disclosure rules) aimed at guaranteeing coordinated access to prof-
its and information to all outside providers of funds. In these environments each principal or
Þnancier can demand potentially different transfers from the entrepreneur or agent but there is
still a centralized governance mechanism that limits the amount of income an agent can retain
by monitoring on behalf of all Þnanciers. On the other hand, situations also abound where no
common institution can be constructed to extract returns of the project. This is the case when
the activity is too idiosyncratic and information sensitive (e.g. at the early stages of a companys
development). Also, in privately held companies or when the Þnanciers provide large amounts of
funds, each has the incentive and the skills to independently affect the extraction of income both
1See for example, the classic pieces by Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Border and Sobel (1987).
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through monitoring and through the transfers.2
In our model, the common agent has the possibility to hide or divert realized income.3 The
fear of inducing increased monitoring activity is what makes proÞt hiding difficult. Suppose top
managers consider lowering the dividend claiming things are bad and use secretly the proceeds to
raise perks. Lowering the dividend may trigger additional scrutiny from the minority shareholders,
leading the board of directors to question managerial performance and company accounts, which
may make the additional perks more difficult to obtain.
To present the intuition behind our main results, we take as a benchmark the merged principals
case where the principals can coordinate both monitoring and contracting. Consider now an
environment where principals are able to verify each others monitoring efforts, so that monitoring
can be coordinated or centralized, but each Þnancier can demand potentially different transfers
from the entrepreneur. For instance, each Þnancier may independently arrange for private transfers
based on the information revealed by a central monitor. We Þnd that there will be greater
monitoring and rent extraction than if the principals merged together. This happens even though
monitoring results in a public good  its beneÞt is shared by the principals. We Þnd that each
principal derives a positive externality from the others contracts, which negates the public good
problem. Roughly, by decreasing the repayment he requests from the agent and relying more on
direct monitoring, a given principal attempts to induce other principals to believe that proÞt is
low and to reduce the repayments they respectively ask for.
If the principals do not cooperate in monitoring and choose their efforts independently, we say
monitoring is decentralized. In this case, there is free riding in monitoring efforts and consequently,
the positive externality from the other principals contracts is now counteracted by a negative
externality since each principal under-provides monitoring effort. We show that, in equilibrium,
the second force dominates and we obtain a number of results. Not only is there less monitoring
than in the centralized case, there exist equilibria which involve less monitoring than even the
merged principals case. Free riding between principals leads to a collapse of monitoring for high
proÞt levels and principals rely instead on constant transfers, which introduce debt-like features
in the Þnancial contracts.4 This is in contrast to the case of centralized monitoring, where proÞt
sharing contracts are optimal. It is also worth noting that a zero-monitoring region arises in
our model because of contractual externalities and not from an assumption about the monitoring
technology as in the well-known costly state veriÞcation (CSV) approach. In the CSV models, the
2See for example Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Pagano and Röell (1998).
3See, for example, Pagano and Röell (1998), La Porta et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002).
4The reduction of monitoring when principals choose efforts independently, may be seen as another example of
the parallel that Tirole (2001) draws between low-powered incentives in multi-principal problems and in multi-task
agency, where it is important not to make payments too sensitive to the performance of a single task to the detriment
of attention to other tasks.
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optimality of debt contracts is typically derived from an assumption of constant marginal cost of
verifying income or an arbitrary restriction to deterministic auditing.5
The point that equity is more useful in settings where monitoring costs are low has also been
noted by Boyd and Smith (1999), who show that the optimal mix of debt and equity in a companys
liability structure depends on the observability of the returns of the underlying assets. When it
is possible to combine investment technologies with differences in observability of the returns, the
technology with unobservable returns is funded with debt while the technology with observable
returns leads to equity Þnancing.
Since Diamond (1984) it is well known that delegating monitoring activity to a common or
centralized monitor avoids duplication when many Þnanciers are involved in Þnancing a project.
Our Þndings, however, challenge the notion that non-cooperative contracting leads to excessive
monitoring with respect to the merged principals case. As indicated above, we Þnd that the validity
of this claim depends on the type of monitoring arrangement (centralized or decentralized) the
non-cooperative Þnanciers follow. Our result that there is less monitoring in the decentralized
case than in the centralized case is linked to Carletti (2004), where two-bank lending may be
preferred to single bank lending because single-bank lending results in excessive monitoring in a
moral hazard setting.
The issue of multiple lending in models of costly repayment enforcement has been rarely
tackled. The early studies that focused on delegated monitoring following Diamond (1984) do
not look at the strategic interaction between Þnanciers. A paper closely related to ours is Winton
(1995) that studies how seniority of creditors reduces the amount of costly auditing. Besides using
a different monitoring technology, that paper does not consider the strategic interactions between
Þnanciers using a common agency framework as we have done.
Contractual externalities have also been identiÞed to be important in the context of multiple
lending. Tirole (2002) argues that investors do not have incentive to take into account the impact
of the various elements of their lending relationship (level and structure of investment, monitoring,
and exercise of control rights) on the returns of the other investors. In a moral hazard setting,
Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) show that when agents may borrow sequentially from several lenders,
the level of indebtedness increases with respect to the case in which the borrower can commit to
borrow from one bank only.
In this paper we take as given the presence of multiple Þnanciers, but it is easy to argue why
that may be so. A Þrst set of reasons has to do with diversiÞcation. For instance the separation
of ownership and control in public companies where many investors, often small and dispersed,
hire professional managers to run Þrms raises issues of multiple funding. DiversiÞcation is also
5See for example, Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Freixas and Rochet (1998).
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the reason for multiple sources of funds in syndicated loans, LDCs lending, and when regulations
prevent banks from gaining control of Þrms, or limit the exposure of a Þnancial institution to a
single risk. Lenders may simply be resource constrained as in Dewatripont and Maskin (1989).
Other reasons are related to information: multiple lending may limit a banks information rents
at an interim stage (Hellwig (1991), Rajan (1992)), provides protection against information loss
following a banks distress (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000)), deters strategic default by
making reorganization more costly (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)), and makes the soft-budget-
constraint problem less severe (Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)). Multiple banking relations may
also result from the trade off between the costs of effort duplication and sharing of monitoring
beneÞts on the one hand, and the beneÞt from the diseconomies of scale in monitoring each bank
faces when monitoring alone on the other hand (Carletti 2004). Funding may also arise as a
by product of another trade. For example, in trade credit, multiple lending occurs when several
suppliers provide inputs to the same customer that does not pay cash. Finally, in a model with
complete information, Parlour and Rajan (2001) show that multiple contracting in an unsecured
credit market is an equilibrium outcome when the borrowers default payoff is increasing in the
number of loans accepted.
Although cast in the realm of Þnancial contracting, our paper also contributes to the more
general theory of common agency under adverse selection.6 This literature has analyzed contrac-
tual externalities between competing mechanism designers when principals may control different
activities of a common agent who has private information about some parameter relevant for
contracting. In our Þnancial contract framework, these activities correspond to the monitoring
efforts of each principal and the agent has private information on realized income. At a general
level, the literature has stressed the inefficiency in rent extraction that arises in such contexts
and how contractual externalities depend on whether the contracting activity controlled by one
principal affects directly or not the utility function of competing mechanism designers.7 Direct ex-
ternalities are present in our framework as a Þnancier beneÞts when others monitor. We show that
these externalities play a signiÞcant role in explaining the structure of contracts. Understanding
how limits on contracting affect outcomes is precisely the task that we undertake below in our
6Applications already span several Þelds. Laffont and Tirole (1991) analyze regulation; Martimort (1992 and
1996), Mezzetti (1997) and Stole (1997) deal with non-linear pricing and manufacturer-retailers relationships; Biais,
Martimort and Rochet (2000) study competing market-makers on Þnancial markets. Martimort and Stole (2002)
and Peters (2001, 2003) offer theoretical frameworks to understand what are the natural classes of mechanisms to
be studied. For models of common agency under moral hazard, see Bernheim and Whinston (1985 and 1986) among
others.
7For instance, Martimort and Stole (2003) analyze a common retailer-manufacturers example. See also the more
abstract framework of Peters (2003) who stresses the role of direct externalities between the principal on the kind
of mechanisms which can be used. Segal (1999) offers a framework for dealing with contractual externalities under
complete information but reverses the role of the principal and the agents.
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Þnancial contracting environment when we compare the contractual outcomes which arise when
Þnanciers can verify and contract over the monitoring efforts of others and when they cannot. In
that respect, this paper contributes to the literature on incomplete contracting by tracing out in-
efficiencies and contractual forms as contracts are less and less comprehensive. We show therefore
that transaction costs that prevent comprehensive and cooperative contracting have a signiÞcant
impact on the shapes of observed Þnancial contracts. Equity-like contracts emerge for environ-
ments with low transaction costs, i.e., when the principals can verify each others monitoring
efforts, whereas debt-like features appear otherwise.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3 analyzes
the case where principals cooperate. In Section 4, we move to the case where principals play
non-cooperatively in transfers but cooperate in monitoring efforts. In Section 5, we consider the
case where principals compete both in transfers and in monitoring. We conclude in Section 6.
Most of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
An investment project needs two inputs: capital and the service of a specialized agent. The agent
has zero wealth so outsiders must provide funds if the project is to be realized. The principals
(Þnanciers) P1 and P2 do not have the specialized skills to realize the project so they hire an
agent and provide him with funds. Technically, we consider a case of intrinsic common agency,
i.e., without funding from both principals, the project would not be realized.8 For simplicity, we
assume that each principal provides half the funding. The agents task is to use his specialized
skills to realize the project and then deliver the proÞt to the principals. The investment of Þxed
size returns a stochastic proÞt θ, the state of nature, with θ ≤ θ ≤ θ where the lowest bound on
proÞt is θ > 0. Except when explicitly stated, we will also assume that θ¯ < ∞. The parameter
θ has a density function f(θ) > 0 for all θ, a cumulative distribution function F (θ), and, for
technical reasons that will be clear later, a weakly decreasing hazard rate 1−F (θ)f(θ) . The principals
and agent are risk neutral.
We consider an environment with limited legal protection of outside shareholders, which is
captured by assuming that the agent is able to observe the realization of the proÞt, θ, while
the principals know only its distribution. This gives the agent the opportunity to divert or hide
some of the realized proÞt. Thus, we follow a large literature that has analyzed how company
insiders have the power to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors (see, among others,
Pagano and Röell (1998), La Porta, et al. (2002) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)). To focus
8For example, each Þnancier is resource constrained and holds only half of the unit of capital needed to implement
the project. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) make a similar assumption.
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on the problem of proÞt diversion we assume that θ is exogenous, i.e., the agent cannot inßuence
θ. ProÞt diversion consists of any activity that allows insiders to retain some of the proÞt, for
example through self-dealing transactions like excessive executive salaries, loan guarantees for
the top executives, transfer pricing favorable to the controlling shareholders. In the context of
less developed or transition economies, proÞt diversion can take more crude forms like outright
stealing. The recent corporate scandals in the US and in Europe provide ample evidence that
proÞt diversion is an ubiquitous phenomenon.
Each principal Pk can devote an effort pk ∈ [0, 1] , k = 1, 2, monitoring the agent after the
projects return is realized, and the monitoring efforts are contractible between each principal and
the agent. Monitoring with overall effort q prevents the agent from hiding a fraction q ∈ [0, 1]
of realized income or proÞt θ where q = Q (p1, p2) . The more resources are spent in monitoring
the smaller is the amount that the agent can hide. Thus monitoring by one principal reduces
the overall amount of proÞt hiding and hence beneÞts also the other principal. However the
marginal beneÞt of increasing effort by one principal decreases as the other himself exerts a higher
effort. This captures the fact that the actions of the principals may result in wasteful monitoring
duplications. We capture these elements by assuming that q ≡ p1 + p2 − p1p2.9 Monitoring effort
for principal Pk comes at a cost given by the function C (pk) , where C(0) = 0, C 0 (pk) > 0 for
pk > 0, C
00 (pk) > 0 for all pk, and C(·) satisÞes the Inada conditions C 0 (0) = 0, C 0 (1) =∞.
In our model, monitoring is an ex post activity that can vary with realized proÞt, and it reduces
the wedge between realized value and income that can be paid to outsiders. We therefore model
in a stylized fashion one of the central issues of corporate governance: namely that outsiders must
spend resources to induce insiders to pay out. Our analysis focuses on the strategic aspects of the
use of these resources by non-cooperating principals. In the corporate environment monitoring
effort can take various forms. It can represent the use of institutions like lawyers, certiÞed public
accountants, auditors, bankruptcy courts, independent directors, and legal action by shareholders.
They all represent some form of active monitoring that makes proÞt hiding more difficult for the
agent. The strength of such actions is typically inversely related to performance: in other words,
we expect to Þnd that the principals will scrutinize the agent more intensively the less income
the agent pretends to have had. Of course, the extent to which these monitoring actions can be
pursued depends on the legal environment (La Porta, et al. (1998)).
To alleviate the need to exert monitoring effort, the principals may also ask for a transfer
from the agent. Thus, we assume that the agent pays an amount tk to each principal. If there
were full information, each principal would use only tk to obtain their share of the proÞt. Under
asymmetric information, the principals could get at most θ if they relied on transfers alone. The
9 In footnote 20, in Section 5, we discuss the implications if the marginal impact of one principals effort on q
increased with the other principals effort.
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principals monitoring efforts not only reduces proÞt hiding, but may also allow them to obtain
higher transfers, for example, by designing contracts that trigger greater monitoring effort for
smaller transfers. We refer to q as total monitoring effort even though, strictly speaking, it is
only the fraction of realized proÞt that the agent is unable to divert as a result of the monitoring
efforts pk. Thus, the total fraction of recovered income is
qθ+t1+t2
θ , where q represents the direct
impact of recovery effort.
The fraction of realized proÞt that the agent cannot hide, qθ, becomes public, and is divided
equally between the principals. Thus a principal Pks payoff is the transfer from the agent plus
half the non-diverted proÞt minus the cost of the monitoring effort of that principal:
Wk = tk +
qθ
2
− C (pk) . (1)
The part of realized θ that does not accrue to the principals goes to the agent, whose payoff is:
U = (1− q) θ − t1 − t2. (2)
The agent is protected by limited liability so that U ≥ 0 for every proÞt level, and the opportunity
cost for the agents specialized skills is normalized to zero. Thus, the agents payoff represents the
rent from private information about θ as limited by the two instruments the principals can employ
 monitoring and transfers. In reality, this rent is likely to be a combination of explicit and implicit
rewards. Executive compensation offers an example of explicit rewards: both the level of executive
pay and the importance of performance pay indicate that executive compensation packages are
often structured to deal with agents who have an informational advantage. On the contrary, in
less sophisticated Þnancial contexts, payments of information rents may also take implicit forms
like tunneling, corporate perks, etc., or outright theft. More generally the information rent is
a component of the control rights that informed insiders can obtain at the expense of outside
investors and that can be found in different degrees in all types of Þnancial systems.
The principals opportunity cost of funds and the monitoring cost are small enough so that
the participation constraint of each principal never binds. Normalizing the principals opportunity
cost of funds and the size of the investment to one, we must thus have the expected value ofWk to
be greater than 12 , a condition that we assume to be satisÞed in this analysis, and which necessarily
holds when uncertainty on types, θ¯ − θ, is small enough.
3 Cooperative contracting or merged principals
We begin by presenting a benchmark with no strategic interaction between the principals. Thus
we assume that both principals P1 and P2 can cooperate fully in their monitoring efforts pk as
if they are merged as one, and they offer a joint contract t(·). For example, such cooperation
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between lenders is achieved through the lead manager when loans are syndicated. For the rest of
this section we will thus refer to the merged principals in the singular.
Contract setting: In this fully cooperative environment, each principal can verify the others
effort and the transfer received from the agent. Thus the merged principal chooses the monitoring
efforts p1 and p2 to minimize the joint cost for any overall effort q. Remembering that q =
p1 + p2 − p1p2, the cost of implementing q when the principals merge is denoted by C(·),10 which
is the solution to the cost minimization problem:
C (q) = min
p1,p2
C (p1) + C (p2) , (P C)
s.t. q = p1 + p2 − p1p2.
We make the necessary technical assumptions to ensure that C(·) is well behaved and that this
cost minimization is achieved for an interior symmetric solution such that q = p(2− p).11 Those
conditions are presented in the Appendix as Lemma 1.
The merged principal offers a joint contract based on the total monitoring effort q, denoted by
t(q), i.e., the agent is offered a menu of options from which he chooses which repayment and associ-
ated monitoring effort he prefers.12 Hence, instead of working with direct revelation mechanisms,
we work here with indirect mechanisms, i.e., nonlinear schedules mapping the agents choice of a
q into a payment t to the principal. The Revelation Principle is then replaced by the Taxation
Principle.13 The motivation for doing so is twofold. On the one hand, the theoretical work on
common agency, which we will rely on later when analyzing the non-cooperative case, has stressed
that direct revelation mechanisms might be of little help in competing contracts environments.
Instead, the Taxation Principle still applies.14 On the other hand, direct mechanisms are artiÞcial
10Since the principals contract on total effort q, in this section and the next, we could have simply used a cost
function C(q) and let the principals share this total cost. As will become clear later, the main reason to introduce
this function C(·) is to have a cost of effort function that is comparable across cases when principals coordinate and
do not coordinate their monitoring efforts.
11 It is worth stressing that, in the absence of such assumptions on C(·), cost minimization may be achieved for an
asymmetric solution, for instance p1 = q and p2 = 0. This means that efficiency considerations require that only one
monitor is used even when principals merge perfectly. Note this is not an issue in the centralized or merged cases
since the contracts depend directly on q. We leave for future research the analysis of these asymmetric situations in
the case of decentralized monitoring.
12Of course, these mechanisms inherit the usual caveat on commitment, and we will assume that the principal
is committed to implement the q that is chosen by the agent. Khalil and Parigi (1998) analyze the case where
the principal cannot commit to audit in a CSV model. See also Krasa and Villamil (2000) who show that debt is
optimal if the principal cannot commit to enforce contracts.
13See Rochet (1985).
14Martimort and Stole (2003) show that focusing on the set of nonlinear prices may allow a complete characteri-
zation of pure strategy equilibria with non-random mechanisms in common agency environments similar to that we
analyze here. On this see also Peters (2001).
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theoretical tools, even with a merged principal. Direct communication of the agents type to the
principal is only relevant insofar it determines the fraction q and one may as well let the agent
choose directly this latter payoff-relevant variable.
The timing of the game goes as follows. First, the principal offers the contract t(q), which is a
menu of ordered pairs of transfers and monitoring efforts. Second, the agent learns θ. Third, given
the contract and conditional on realized θ, the agent chooses the pair of transfer and monitoring
effort that will be implemented. The principal recovers qθ + t(q), where θ is the realized income,
while the agent keeps the rest θ − qθ − t(q).
Anticipating the agents choice given a contract: We can deÞne the agents information
rent as:
U(θ) = max
q
(1− q) θ − t (q) , (3)
and limited liability requires that:
U(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. (4)
The agents private information implies that any choice q(θ) made by an agent having obtained
a proÞt θ must be incentive compatible. The incentive compatibility constraint can be obtained
from U (θ) using the Envelope Theorem; namely:
úU(θ) = 1− q(θ) for all θ. (5)
Standard revealed-preference arguments show also that q(·) (resp. t(·)) is decreasing (resp. in-
creasing) with respect to θ and thus a.e. differentiable with a derivative such that:
úq(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. (6)
Note that (6) is also the second-order condition associated with (3). The conditions (5) and (6)
capture the essence of the incentive problem and conform to familiar intuitions of contracting
problems under hidden information. The only way to reduce the rent of the agent is by increasing
q(·), and to discourage the agent from understating income, q(·) must be decreasing in θ.
To see precisely how the principal inßuences the agents choice of q(θ), using the a.e. differen-
tiability of the repayment schedule t(·), we explicitly state the agents Þrst-order condition with
respect to q that is associated with (3):
−θ = t0(q(θ)) < 0 for all θ. (7)
Therefore, to induce the agent to choose a higher q, the principal must reduce the repayment, by
reducing the slope of t(·).We refer to this reduction15 in t0(q(θ)) as the marginal incentive cost of
15Since t0(q(θ)) is negative, a reduction here means making t0(q(θ)) even more negative.
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inducing a unit increase in q(θ), which is in addition to the physical marginal cost C 0(q(θ)) borne
by the principal. Exploring how this cost changes in the common agency setting will be a key
theme of the paper and will help explain the various results we obtain.
Now we can present the principals problem in the merged or cooperative benchmark, denoted
thereafter by (Pm). The principal chooses the effort q(·) and the monetary payment t(·) to
maximize his net payoff anticipating the agents incentives:
max
{q(·),t(·)}
Z θ¯
θ
f (θ)
³
− C (q (θ)) + θq (θ) + t (q (θ))
´
dθ (Pm)
s.t. (3), (4), (5) and (6).
Using the superscript m to refer to optimal values of the merged case, we present the Þrst set
of results.
Proposition 1 The optimal contract offered when the principals merge as one entails:
 A total monitoring effort qm(θ) non-increasing in θ, given by
C 0(qm(θ)) =
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
for all θ, (8)
with no monitoring effort applied only for the highest proÞt level, yielding qm(θ¯) = 0.
 A total payment by the agent, qm(θ)θ + tm(q(θ)), that is increasing and concave in θ.
Proof In the Appendix.
The condition (8) is familiar from incentive problems with hidden information. An increase
in q(x) discourages understatement of income by all θ > x. Hence, the marginal beneÞt of
increasing q(x) is the reduction of rent by a unit for all θ > x, given by 1−F (x), which is balanced
against the expected marginal cost f(x) C 0(q(x)). Monitoring is optimal except for the highest
proÞt. As outcomes get worse, monitoring increases and the scope for hiding proÞt decreases,
which is succinctly implied by the agents second-order condition (6). Our result indicates that
the agent is held to account more intensively if he pretends to have had bad luck, a feature of
many instances where monitoring takes place after agents actions.
The total payment is also concave for this very reason: at the margin, the principals abil-
ity to increase the total payment decreases since incentive compatibility requires that q(·) be
non-increasing. Therefore, the total payment from the agent to the merged principal resembles
dividends paid to outside equity holders in that the repayment grows with proÞt but never ab-
sorbs all the proÞt. The agent is the residual claimant and his payoff resembles that of an inside
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equity-holder that keeps an increasing proportion of proÞt. With better outcomes the importance
of transfers to extract proÞt increases relative to monitoring.
If the marginal cost of monitoring were constant, say c, (8) would be replaced by the condition
q(θ) = 0 if and only if
c >
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (9)
and q(θ) = 1 otherwise. The optimal contract is then a debt contract such that the entire proÞt is
extracted for low θ and no monitoring for high proÞt levels. By assuming a monitoring technology
with decreasing returns we will stress in Section 5 how contracts may acquire debt-like features
due to strategic reasons only.
We deÞne by pm(·) the individual monitoring effort of a given principal that solves problem
P C and minimizes the total cost of monitoring given qm(·). We have qm(θ) = pm(θ)(2 − pm(θ))
and it is easy to check that (8) becomes:
C0(pm(θ)) = (1− pm(θ))
µ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¶
for all θ, (10)
where the joint cost function C(·) is replaced by the primitive individual cost function C(·).
This expression will be useful to perform comparisons with the case where the principals do not
cooperate in monitoring that we present in Section 5.
4 Non-Cooperative Contracts and Centralized Monitoring Ef-
forts
Even if monitoring is centralized under a common governance mechanism, common agency issues
can affect the outcome of the monitoring game. In this section, we illustrate this using a case
where principals have direct non-cooperative Þnancial relationships with the agent. Financiers may
independently arrange for private transfers but agree to rely on a common monitoring technology
whose cost they bear (e.g. a bankruptcy court or a third party that monitors on their behalf).
By altering ones contract, each principal affects the agents choice and thus tries to use the agent
to mislead the other principal. Therefore, even though monitoring is centralized, if the principals
cannot coordinate their contracts, each principal derives a positive externality from the other
principals contract, and in equilibrium, there is more monitoring than in the cooperative case.
As a result, all parties are worse off  the principals and the agent. This implies that when
monitoring is centralized, it is important to limit uncoordinated direct relationships between
principals and the common agent. For example, in syndicated loans the lead manager performs
exactly the function of preventing side contracting between each lender and the borrower.
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Contract setting: We now consider situations where the two principals choose their contracts
tk(q) for k = 1, 2, non-cooperatively. The principals jointly prevent diversion of the fraction q of
realized income. We assume, for simplicity, that the principals share equally the cost and proceeds
from centralized monitoring: each principal bears half the cost of q,
C(q)
2 , and each receives half of
the non-diverted proÞt, qθ2 , where θ is the realized proÞt.
16 As is readily seen, the analysis in this
section also captures the case where the principals are able to delegate the monitoring activity
(without further agency cost) and they share the cost of the delegated monitor that exerts an
effort q.
The principals compete by simultaneously offering the nonlinear transfer schemes tk(q), with
k = 1, 2. Given the two contracts, after observing θ, the agent chooses the transfers and associated
monitoring effort that will be implemented. For technical purposes, we also restrict attention to
contracts which are differentiable almost everywhere.17 We will look for a Nash equilibrium in
differentiable contracts {tc1 (q) ; tc2 (q)} (thereafter an equilibrium) where the superscript c refers
to equilibrium values in the centralized monitoring case.
Externality from P2s contract  anticipating the agents choice given tc2(q) : We
intend to compute P1s best response to a nonlinear contract tc2 (·) offered by P2, and the Þrst
step is to anticipate the agents choice of q to a contract offered by P1. Rewriting the agents
problem in the case of two principals competing in transfers we obtain the following expression of
the agents information rent:
U (θ) = max
q
(1− q) θ − t1 (q)− tc2 (q) for all θ. (11)
Applying the Envelope Theorem to (11) again yields (5). Similarly, second-order conditions are
still characterized by (6) as in the cooperative or merged principals case of Section 3.
The strategic interaction between the principals is best illustrated by showing how P1s mar-
ginal incentive cost of inducing an increase in q changes compared to the case of the merged
principals. For any nonlinear schedule t1(·) offered by P1, the agents Þrst-order condition associ-
ated with (11) becomes:
θ + t01 (q (θ)) + t
c0
2 (q (θ)) = 0 for all θ. (12)
Just as in the previous case, P1 needs to lower the marginal repayment t01(·) to induce a marginal
increase in the choice of monitoring q. However, P1 also needs now to anticipate the effect of
the equilibrium contract of P2 on the agents behavior. Given the equilibrium contract tc2(·), an
16We lose little by assuming that the principals share the cost and proceeds of monitoring equally. Instead of 1
2
,
if they used the fractions λ and (1 − λ) to divide cost and undiverted proÞt, the equilibrium level of monitoring
would remain unchanged, characterized by condition (13) in Proposition 2.
17This is a standard restriction in common agency games. See Martimort (1992) and Stole (1997).
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increase in q at a given θ implies a movement along the schedule tc2(·).18 In the Appendix, we
show that tc2(q) is decreasing and convex in a symmetric equilibrium. The term t
c0
2 (·) in condition
(12) captures the fact that the agent pays a smaller transfer to P2 if the agent chooses a higher
monitoring intensity q(θ), given tc2(·). The intuition goes as follows: since an agent with a higher
proÞt chooses to be monitored less ( úq(θ) ≤ 0), P1 tricks P2 into believing that the realized
income is lower by inducing an increase in monitoring q(θ), which induces P2 to ask for a lower
transfer.
Of course, in equilibrium the principals are not tricked, but this incentive externality that each
principals contract bestows upon the other principal, leads to a greater amount of monitoring
under non-cooperative contracting than in the benchmark case. We can interpret this as too much
monitoring since the size of proÞt is exogenous, and aggregate welfare depends only on the amount
of monitoring. Thus, in this model, aggregate welfare decreases with the amount of monitoring.
We report the main results of this section:
Proposition 2 The unique equilibrium of the non-cooperative program where the principals coor-
dinate in choosing their monitoring efforts is symmetric with tc1(q) = t
c
2(q) = t
c(q) and it entails:
 A total monitoring effort, qc(θ), given by
C 0(qc(θ)) = 2
µ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¶
for all θ, (13)
that is non-increasing in θ with no monitoring effort for the highest proÞt level only, yielding
qc(θ¯) = 0.
 A total monitoring effort that is higher than the cooperative or merged case, qc(θ) > qm(θ)
for θ < θ¯.
 A total payment by the agent, θq(θ) + 2tc(q(θ)), that is increasing and concave in θ; it is
higher than the total payment under the merged case for all θ > θ.
Proof In the Appendix.
Externality and excessive monitoring: Even though the incentive externality identiÞed
above plays a critical role, we need to account for two other effects to explain why there is more
18To be more precise, any such movement along the schedule tc2(·) is only possible if this latter schedule is
sufficiently extended for monitoring efforts which are out of the equilibrium set (the same will be true also in the
case of decentralized monitoring efforts). These extensions are not really a difficulty here. It suffices to Þnd a twice
differentiable extension of the equilibrium schedule over the interval [p(0), 1]. See Martimort (1992) for such an
analysis.
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monitoring relative to cooperative contracting. First, monitoring is a public good as an increase
in monitoring results in the other principal obtaining half of qθ. Second, each principal incurs only
half the marginal cost of monitoring. We show below that the reduction in P1s incentive cost due
to P2s contract exactly negates the Þrst effect, i.e., the loss to P2 of half the extracted income
from monitoring. Thus, it is the second effect, the shared cost of monitoring, that determines the
increase in q(θ) relative to the merged principals case, and this is captured in condition (13).
To see the argument more precisely, let us reproduce P1s best response from the Appendix.
The total effort that P1 would like to implement in a best response to P2s contract tc2(·), is given
by condition (30) in the Appendix:
1
2
C 0(q(θ)) =
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
− θ
2
− tc02 (q(θ)) for all θ. (14)
It is useful to contrast this expression with condition (8) of the previous section where the principals
are merged as one. In the current case, each principal pays half the marginal cost of monitoring
an agent with proÞt θ, but does not capture the entire marginal beneÞt 1−F (θ)f(θ) from reducing the
information rent of this agent in case his proÞt is higher than θ. The other principal takes away θ2 .
The Þnal term represents the externality that P2s contract exerts on P1: the marginal incentive
cost of inducing a unit increase in q(θ) is lowered by the amount −tc02 (q(θ)) as we saw in (12).
Were it not for this externality, the marginal beneÞt of monitoring would become negative when
the agents proÞt is sufficiently large, i.e., for θ > θ∗, where θ∗ is deÞned by
θ∗
2
=
1− F (θ∗)
f(θ∗)
. (15)
The fact that 1−F (θ)f(θ) is decreasing in θ ensures that there exists a unique θ
∗ such that θ < θ∗ < θ¯
when θf(θ) < 2, i.e., if θ and/or f(θ) is small enough, an assumption that we will make from now
on. The externality results in monitoring of all but the highest proÞt level, but without it there
would be zero monitoring for proÞt levels greater than θ∗.
We will argue here that the incentive externality and the leakage of θ2 to the other principal
cancel each other and we obtain the identiÞed condition (13) to characterize the outcome qc(θ).
Condition (12) shows that the principals share the marginal incentive cost of inducing an increase
in q. Since the agents utility is separable in transfers, this burden is exactly equal to the extra
income extracted, where θ represents the marginal extracted income due to a unit increase in q(θ).
Since the equilibrium is symmetric, we have tc0(q(θ)) = −θ2 . Thus P1s incentive cost of inducing a
marginal increase in q is half the amount of what it was in the cooperative case, which was given
by condition (7). Then, condition (14) shows that the marginal beneÞt from increasing q(θ) is
exactly the same as in the cooperative case, while the marginal cost to P1 is halved, which leads
to excessive monitoring. Now we can apply the standard intuition for negative externalities: P1
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does not take into account that given the contract tc2(·), P2s return goes down as P1 induces a
higher monitoring effort, which results in higher monitoring in equilibrium.
Figure 1 about here
From the incentive constraint (5), we know that the rent is lower if q(·) is higher. Hence,
common agency leads to too much extraction of the agents information rent:
U c(θ) < Um(θ) for all θ
except for the lowest level of proÞt where those two rents are both equal to zero. All parties pre-
fer cooperative or merged contracting rather than non-cooperative contracting under centralized
monitoring. While total payment to each principal is higher, each principals payoff as well as
welfare (i.e., the sum of payoffs of the principals and the agent) is lower under non-cooperative
contracting. Therefore, our analysis suggests that it is important to limit uncoordinated side
contracts between principals and a common agent when monitoring is centralized.
Again, we can deÞne by pc(·) the individual monitoring effort of a given principal that solves
the problem of a principal and minimizes the total cost of monitoring given qc(·). It is easy to
check that pc(θ) is uniquely characterized by
C 0(pc(θ)) = 2(1− pc(θ))
µ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¶
. (16)
Modeling issues: Two aspects of centralized monitoring under non-cooperative contracting
encourage principals to increase monitoring. First, each principal exploits the agents role as a
communication channel to reap some beneÞts from the other principals contract. Second, each
principal can affect total monitoring effort q directly by changing only his own contract, which
relies on the assumption that each principal is committed to increase his effort as needed to support
the chosen q. In equilibrium, this implies that each principal increases his individual effort pk by
a unit when the other raises his by a unit, i.e., there is no free riding in monitoring efforts.
If the principals chose their individual efforts pk independently, the contract offered by each
principal will have to be based on his own monitoring effort pk only instead of q. A principal,
then, would not be able to affect q directly by changing only his own contract with the agent. He
would have to rely on the other principals effort too, which will be strategically chosen and may
not increase as much as desired. The positive externality from each others contract would also
be weaker. We study these issues in the next section.
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5 Non-Cooperative Contracts and Decentralized Monitoring Ef-
forts
In a monitoring context where no common institution can be constructed to extract the returns
of the project, the theme of free riding in monitoring efforts becomes central. This issue could not
be addressed under centralized monitoring since we assumed that the principals could verify each
others efforts. Here we allow the principals to choose their efforts independently. For example
each principal could hire his own lawyers to put pressure on the agent to pay out income even
if the total amount of income that can be extracted is the result of the joint efforts. Hence,
we consider a situation with an even greater incompleteness of contracts than in the previous
section: not only do the principals not coordinate in choosing transfers, but each principal does
not observe the effort of the other in monitoring the common agent. We Þnd that there will
be free riding in monitoring efforts, which means that a unit increase in pk is associated with a
less than unit increase in pj 6=k. This leads to a number of results. First, there is less monitoring
than in the case of centralized monitoring which makes the agent better off. Second, and perhaps
more striking is the existence of equilibria where the monitoring level is lower than it is under the
merged principals benchmark. That is non-cooperative contracting does not necessarily lead to
too much monitoring. Third, free riding in monitoring efforts leads to a collapse of monitoring for
high proÞt levels; there is no monitoring if proÞt is above a threshold and principals rely instead
on a constant transfer to extract income in these states. This happens mainly because free riding
in monitoring weakens the incentive externality between the principals.
Contract setting: Under this setting, which we refer to as decentralized monitoring, the
principals monitoring efforts pk for k = 1, 2 are set non-cooperatively, and one principals effort
pk is unobservable by the other principal. Each principal incurs his own cost of effort C(pk). Hence
the indirect mechanisms we consider stipulate a repayment, denoted by tk(pk), to each Pk based
directly on his monitoring effort. Given the pair of contracts tk(pk) for k = 1, 2, the agent picks
the transfer and associated monitoring effort to be implemented by each principal and privately
discloses the pair (tk, pk) only to Pk. The principals share equally the fraction q of non-diverted
proÞt θ. We will look for a Nash equilibrium in differentiable contracts {td1(p1), td2(p2)} where the
superscript refers to the equilibrium values for the decentralized case.
Free riding in monitoring  anticipating the agents choice given td2(p2): Again, we
want to compute the best response of P1 given the equilibrium offer td2(·) of principal 2. A key step
is to anticipate the agents choice of p2 for any given p1 that P1 wants to implement. For this, it
is useful to Þrst deÞne the following indirect utility function, given P2s equilibrium contract:
v(p1, θ) = max
p2
(1− p1)(1− p2)θ − td2(p2) for all (p1, θ). (17)
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Note that 1− q = (1− p1)(1− p2), remembering the deÞnition of q. The function v(·) represents
the agents earning aside from the transfer payment to principal P1, given P2s contract td2(·). This
is all that matters from P1s point of view to assess the costs and beneÞts of changing his own
contract with the agent. Note that treating v(·) as the agents privately known income, we can
consider P1s problem with the agent as a one principal-one agent problem. We Þrst characterize
that agents choice of p2, denoted by p∗2(p1, θ), for any p1 that P1 could want to implement, and
then we present P1s problem in which this response p∗2(p1, θ) is anticipated.
The maximand in (17) is concave if td002 (·) is positive, and in the Appendix we show this to be
true in equilibrium.19 Assuming this for now, we obtain the Þrst-order condition with respect to
p2 that deÞnes the agents choice p∗2(p1, θ) when it is positive:
θ (1− p1) = −td02 (p∗2 (p1, θ)) for all (p1, θ). (18)
Note that we can also use this condition to calculate the marginal incentive cost of inducing an
increase in monitoring effort just like we did in the previous sections. Again, the reduction in
td2(·) captures P2s marginal incentive cost of inducing a unit increase in p2 on top of the direct
marginal cost C 0(p2). Condition (18) shows that this incentive cost for P2 is inversely related
to the other principals effort p1. This is because of wasteful duplication in principals efforts,
∂2q
∂p1∂p2
< 0 : in response to an increase in p1, the agent increases p2 to reduce the part of income
that will be veriÞed.20 In the Appendix, we also show that ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
< 1 in equilibrium, which is rather
intuitive. It simply means that although p1 and p2 are complements, they are only imperfect
complements. In the centralized case of Section 4, we assumed that each principal could affect
the total monitoring effort q(·) by his choice of tk(·), given the other principals contract. Thus,
each principals monitoring effort was identically affected and in that case ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
equaled one by
assumption. In contrast, under decentralized efforts, principals cannot verify each others effort,
and thus each can affect only his own individual effort pk(·). Then, we Þnd that each principal
only increases his own pk(·) by less than a unit for a unit increase in the other principals effort
pj(·). This means that the principals free ride on each other when providing monitoring efforts.
As we will see below, it implies that the incentive externality from the other principals contract
is weakened, which in turn leads to low levels of monitoring and high proÞt levels not being
monitored at all.
19As we will see below, the equilibrium schedule td2(·) is only right differentiable at zero and a more precise analysis
is called for to take into account this corner issue. We address this issue in the Appendix.
20 If instead of assuming wasteful duplication in monitoring effort, we had assumed that q = p1 + p2 + p1p2, we
would have ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
< 0, i.e., monitoring efforts would be strategic substitutes. Free riding would then take the extreme
form of crowding out the other principals effort. In equilibrium, there would be even less monitoring and a larger
interval without monitoring. However, ensuring that the agents problem is globally concave is more difficult with
strategic substitutes than with strategic complements. See Martimort (1992) and Stole (1997) for more on this
topic.
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The result that the principals efforts are imperfect complements is implied by the fact that
the principals cannot verify each others efforts, and they free ride in providing incentive to the
agent to choose higher monitoring efforts. To see why, let us return to the centralized monitoring
case where the principals can verify each others efforts. Instead of viewing the transfers to each
principal as functions of the overall effort level q, one may as well (using the fact that principals
can verify each others efforts) view these transfers as functions of the individual effort levels,
which by symmetry is the same for both principals, namely p such that q = (2− p) p. Then,
the contracts t∗ (q) = tc ((2− p) p) form an equilibrium pair. The agents choice of a common
probability of monitoring p (θ) now solves
p (θ) = argmax
p
(1− p)2 θ − 2t∗ (p) for all θ,
which leads to the Þrst order condition
(1− p∗ (θ)) θ = t∗0 (p∗ (θ)) for all θ, (19)
which is nothing other than (12) rewritten as a symmetric equilibrium. Differentiating (19) with
respect to θ, we can deduce that t∗00 (p∗ (θ)) = 1−p
∗(θ)−θ úp∗(θ)
úp∗(θ) . Let us now return to the decentralized
case where principals cannot verify each others efforts. If one principal, say P2, were to offer
t∗ (p2) , the other principal will deviate from t∗ (p1) and induce the agent to choose p∗2 (p1, θ) such
that∂p
∗
2
∂p1
= − θ
t∗00(p∗2(p1,θ))
< 1. The last step is derived by using t∗ (·) in (18) and the expression for
t∗00 (·) derived above from (19).
Now we move on to set up and solve P1s problem. Standard methods for a single-principal
problem can be employed remembering that, given td2(·), the agents retained earning equals
v(θ, p1). Using the indirect utility formulation in (17), the agents rent is rewritten as
U(θ) = max
p1
v(p1, θ)− t1(p1) for all θ, (20)
from which we obtain by the Envelope Theorem
úU (θ) = vθ(p1(θ), θ),
= (1− p1(θ)) (1− p∗2(p1(θ), θ)) for all θ, (21)
where vθ(·) denotes the partial derivative of v(·) with respect to θ. Even though this incentive
constraint has a form similar to that of the previous incentive constraint (5), it now depends on
p∗2(p1(θ), θ) which in turn depends on the endogenously determined schedule td2(·). Hence, the local
second-order sufficient condition (SOSC) may appear to be more complex than in the centralized
case. However, since p1 and p2 are complements, we show in the Appendix that the local SOSC
can be simpliÞed to get the simple monotonicity condition:
úp1(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. (22)
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Note that the corresponding total effort q in a symmetric equilibrium where both principals
exert the same effort can be written as qd(θ) = pd(θ)(2−pd(θ)). Using this notation and assuming
concavity of each principals problems,21 we can state the following results that characterizes our
main Þndings regarding decentralized monitoring.
Proposition 3 When the principals compete in both contracts and monitoring efforts, there is a
continuum of symmetric equilibria. Every symmetric equilibrium entails:
 A monitoring effort pd(θ) for each principal which is non-increasing in θ; there exists θ such
that θ < θ < θ¯ and pd(θ) = 0 for θ > θ, i.e., no monitoring occurs for proÞt levels above θ.
 A total monitoring effort that is smaller than in the centralized case, qd(θ) < qc(θ) for
θ ∈ (θ, θ¯).22
 A total payment, qθ2 + tk(pk(θ)), from the agent to each principal that is non-decreasing and
concave in θ with payments being constant for θ > θ; this total payment is smaller than the
payment in the centralized case for all θ > θ.
Proof In the Appendix.
Free riding and the outcome  sketch of the arguments: It is precisely the free riding
in monitoring efforts, ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
< 1, that generates the difference in results between the centralized and
decentralized cases. Free riding has an impact via two sources: (i) a unit increase in p1 results
in less than a unit increase in q, and (ii) the incentive externality, which is the reduction in the
cost of providing incentive due to the other principals contract, is also smaller. The Þrst effect
results in a lower amount of monitoring relative to the centralized case, and the second results in
the collapse of monitoring for high income levels.
We can provide some details of the argument by focusing on the condition determining the
optimal p1 that P1 would like to implement as a best response to td2(·), the equilibrium contract
of P2. This condition is given as (33) in the Appendix. Suppressing arguments of functions where
obvious, we can rearrange condition (33) into the following condition:
C 0
³
pd1
´
≥
∙
(1− p∗2) +
∂p∗2
∂p1
(1− pd1)
¸µ
1− F
f
− θ
2
¶
− ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
td02 (p
∗
2) , (23)
where the right hand side represents the marginal beneÞt of increasing p1.23 This marginal beneÞt
is composed of two expressions, with the Þrst one reßecting the impact on q and the extraction of
21This is guaranteed if C(·) is sufficiently convex.
22The equilibrium schedule qd (θ) that begins at qc (θ) has inÞnite slope at θ; for all other solutions qd (θ) , we
have qd (θ) < qc (θ) for θ < θ¯. Finally, qd
¡
θ¯
¢
= qc
¡
θ¯
¢
= 0 for every solution qd (θ) .
23The inequality in (23) is used to capture the fact that, in this decentralized contracting setting, the optimal
solution can be at a zero corner.
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income, while the second captures the effect of the externality from P2s contract. Now we examine
each of these two parts in detail starting with the Þrst. Note that (1 − p2) is the derivative of q
with respect to p1. An increase in p1 increases q directly, and also indirectly via p∗2(·); the terms
in the square brackets capture this increase in q. Note that the effect on q via p∗2(·) is a bit muted
due to free riding. As a result of an increase in q, the agents rent is reduced by 1−Ff , but
θ
2
goes to P2. The term −∂p
∗
2
∂p1
(·)td02 (·) > 0 represents the positive incentive externality from P2s
contract. This externality is different from that under centralized monitoring since now P2 can
only observe a change in his own effort p2, whereas under centralized monitoring it was assumed
that he could observe changes in total effort q. An increase in p1 leads to an increase in p2,
and given his equilibrium contract tc2(·), P2 asks for a lower transfer. But because ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
< 1, the
positive externality stemming from the other principals contract is somewhat counteracted by
a negative externality related to this free riding phenomenon. Without the positive externality³
−∂p∗2∂p1 (·)td02 (·)
´
, monitoring would end at θ∗, deÞned by condition (15), due to the leakage of θ2 .
To see the effect of ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
< 1 more clearly, let us substitute td02 (·) in (23) using (18), and note
that in a symmetric equilibrium we have pd1(θ) = p
∗
2(p1(θ), θ). We can then rewrite (23) as:
C 0
³
pd1
´
≥ (1− pd1)
µ
1− F
f
µ
1 +
∂p∗2
∂p1
¶
+
θ
2
µ
∂p∗2
∂p1
− 1
¶¶
. (24)
Condition (24) precisely captures the difference between the centralized and the decentralized
cases of monitoring. Indeed, under centralized monitoring, the minimization of the monitoring
costs forces principals to credibly commit to offer the same monitoring effort and thus ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
= 1.
Inserting ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
= 1 in condition (24) yields pd(θ) = pc(θ), as can be veriÞed by remembering (16).
Of course, the non-observability of the monitoring effort of P2 by P1 makes such commitment
impossible; in equilibrium, we have free riding and ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
< 1. The difference between pd(θ) and
pc(θ) reßects this new incompleteness. Since p2 and p1 are only imperfect complements, one would
suspect that there will be less monitoring in the decentralized case, i.e., pd(θ) will lie below pc(θ).
While the above comparison is quite intuitive, it is not all that can be inferred from inserting
∂p∗2
∂p1
< 1 in condition (24). Note that the marginal beneÞt of raising p1 is negative for θ close to θ¯,
and hence, there is no monitoring for high values of θ. Then condition (21) implies that úUd(θ) = 1
for these values, and we immediately obtain that the total payment is constant for such levels
of proÞts. Under centralized monitoring, we found that the incentive externality from the other
principal was large enough in condition (14) to make monitoring optimal for all θ < θ¯. Here, with
∂p∗2
∂p1
< 1, the incentive externality is not strong enough to overcome the leakage of θ2 to the other
principal for all income levels. Since pk decreases with θ, condition (18) shows that the marginal
incentive cost increases with θ, and each principal Þnds it prohibitively costly to implement a
positive level of monitoring for high θ.
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Figure 2 about here
With centralized monitoring, the principals are forced to compete only in the repayments they
request from the common agent. A deviation by either principal from the cooperative outcome
can only take the form of a marginal decrease in the repayment asked by this principal in exchange
of a higher monitoring effort. Since principals only bear half of the joint cost of monitoring, they
tend to monitor excessively. Instead, with decentralized monitoring, the principals compete both
in the repayments they request from the agent and the monitoring effort. Since each principal
beneÞts from an increase in total monitoring effort, but only contributes partially to it, there is
a free-riding problem and individual monitoring efforts decrease with respect to the centralized
setting. In particular, this free riding makes monitoring prohibitively costly when income is high
and principals rely on constant transfers.
Structure of equilibria: Having said that the upper bound on the set of outcomes pd(θ)
is given by the hypothetical case, ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
= 1, we now argue that the lower bound is given by the
hypothetical opposite, ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
= 0. In this case the common agent would not change the amount
of monitoring he chooses for P2 as P1 changes his own effort p1, i.e.,
∂p∗2
∂p1
= 0. This contractual
outcome can be viewed as an equilibrium of a quasi-game where each principal is myopic and
believes (wrongly) that he cannot inßuence the agents choice within the menu proposed by the
other principal. In that case, the equilibrium would be obtained by inserting ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
= 0 in (24),
and it would entail a symmetric monitoring effort pL(θ) deÞned by
C 0 (pL(θ)) = (1− pL(θ))
µ
1− F
f
− θ
2
¶
, (25)
for θ ≤ θ∗ and zero otherwise, where θ∗ is deÞned by (15). Of course, the common agent always
modiÞes his choice of p2 (even if it is only by a small amount in some equilibria corresponding to
low levels of monitoring) when P1 changes his own p1. Thus one suspects that any equilibrium
outcome pd(θ) always lies above pL(θ).
In the Appendix, we show that these intuitions are indeed correct, and that all symmetric equi-
libria can be ranked with respect to the monitoring effort. Any such equilibrium lies within these
two boundaries pL(θ) and pc(θ) deÞned above. Note that, as principals behave more myopically,
contracts look more like debt contracts with larger ßat parts.
The fact that there exists a continuum of equilibria indicates the prominent role that players
expectations play in this decentralized environment. In the low equilibria, close to pL(θ), each
principal monitors little because he expects the other to also do the same, so that ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
is close to
zero and his own best response is close to pL(θ). Alternatively, the non-linear equilibrium schedule
td(·) is extremely convex for such equilibria (td00(·) is high) so that principals almost commit not
to change their monitoring efforts too much as θ varies.
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Instead, for high equilibria, close to pc(θ), each principal monitors a lot because he expects
the other to do so as well, and his own best response is close to pc(θ). The non-linear equilibrium
schedule td(·) is less convex (td00(·) is small) so that the agent reacts a lot to a change in monitoring
effort by each principal. If a principal, say P1, envisions deviating by reducing his individual
monitoring effort, the agent will choose to reduce also signiÞcantly the monitoring effort he requests
of P2.We are close to the case of centralized monitoring, which is characterized by an over-provision
of monitoring effort.
Since there is less monitoring, less information rent is extracted under decentralized monitoring,
compared to the centralized case, and we have:
U c(θ) < Ud(θ) for all θ > θ.
Being forced to compete also in monitoring efforts to extract income makes the principals weaker:
as the proverb goes the onlooker gets the better of a Þght, and the agent is better off.
The equilibrium under decentralized monitoring can be also compared with the cooperative
outcome achieved under the merged principals benchmark. In particular we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 4 Assume that ddθ
³
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
´
≥ −12 . Noting that pL (θ) is deÞned by (25), take any
symmetric equilibrium pd(θ) under decentralized monitoring:
 if pd(θ) ∈ [pL(θ), pm(θ)], then pd(θ) < pm(θ) for all θ in [θ, θ¯] (there exist decentralized
equilibria where there is less monitoring than under the cooperative or merged principals
case).
 if pd(θ) ∈ (pm(θ), pc(θ)), then there exists θ such that θ < θ < θ and pd(θ) ≥ pm(θ) if
and only if θ ∈ [θ, θ] (there is no symmetric decentralized equilibrium that involves more
monitoring than under the merged principals case for all proÞt levels).
Proof In the Appendix.
The proposition shows that equilibria under decentralized contracting exhibit a strong ten-
dency towards low level of monitoring. As long as the hazard rate does not decline too quickly,
d
dθ
³
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
´
≥ −12 , the decentralized equilibria pd (θ) that start below pm (θ) , stay below pm (θ)
throughout. Even those equilibria corresponding to relatively ßat nonlinear schedules t(q) (i.e.,
those with a high pd(θ)) fall below the cooperative outcome for sufficiently high levels of proÞt.
This feature of the equilibrium captures again the two externalities at play when principals do not
merge. On the one hand, there might be excessive monitoring because each principal only bears
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half of the incentive cost from monitoring exactly as if the monitoring effort was veriÞable by both
principals. This effect might dominate for low levels of proÞt, i.e., when monitoring is crucial at
least for some equilibria. On the other hand, there is too little monitoring because of free riding
when monitoring efforts are non-veriÞable and this effect always dominates in any equilibrium for
sufficiently high levels of proÞts, i.e., when monitoring is less of an issue anyway.
Welfare: We can easily observe that total welfare (i.e., the sum of the two principals and
the agents payoffs) is maximized when the expected cost of the monitoring efforts is minimized.
The ranking of equilibria that we have found above leads us immediately to state that welfare
is maximum in the lowest symmetric equilibrium of the decentralized case. In particular it is
larger than even that under the merged case since some symmetric equilibria lie strictly below
pm(θ) for all θ in [θ, θ¯) (i.e., those such that pd(θ) ∈ [pL(θ), pm(θ)] under the assumption of
Proposition 4). Also, every symmetric decentralized equilibrium dominates the equilibrium under
centralized monitoring from a welfare point of view. Thus, in our framework, if contracting cannot
be coordinated, welfare is higher when monitoring is also uncoordinated. While the welfare effect of
a merger between two principals with centralized monitoring is positive, a merger of two principals
that compete both in contracts and monitoring efforts has ambiguous welfare implications.
ProÞt of the principals: It is also interesting to compare the different cases or institutional
arrangements in terms of the aggregate proÞts of the principals. Since θ is exogenous, the best
arrangement should achieve the minimal value of the overall costs, including Þrst monitoring costs
but also the expected information rent left to the agent. The best arrangement would be our
benchmark where the principals merge and minimize the sum of these two costs at pm(θ). Note
that even though some decentralized outcomes pd (θ) have lower amount of monitoring than pm (θ)
(Proposition 4), these decentralized outcomes are inferior to pm (θ) from the principals viewpoint
as they do not adequately account for the cost of rent left to the agent.
The comparison between decentralized and centralized monitoring is less trivial and an in-
teresting trade-off emerges. Indeed, we know from Proposition 4 that, in some equilibria pd(θ)
is closer to the cooperative outcome pm(θ) than pc(θ), for low levels of proÞts whereas pc(θ) is
closer to pm(θ) for high levels close to θ¯. This suggests that centralized (resp. decentralized)
monitoring may be preferred when the distribution of proÞt puts enough (resp. little) weight on
high levels of proÞts. Using this intuition, we construct below an example to show that there
exist parameter conÞgurations such that the sum of proÞts for the two principals can be higher
under either centralized or decentralized monitoring. Therefore, either monitoring arrangement
could be preferable from the principals viewpoint depending on the underlying fundamentals of
the problem.
The comparison between the two non-cooperative modes is made quite difficult because it
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requires Þrst to compute explicitly the equilibrium schedule pd(θ) which is a solution to a highly
nonlinear differential equation and, if such a solution can be characterized, to compute the ex-
pected overall cost of the corresponding allocation. To nevertheless give an example of such a
proÞt comparison between the two non-cooperative institutional arrangements, consider the case
of an exponential distribution on [θ,+∞], F (θ) = 1− e−2(θ−θ), with 0 < θ < 1 to guarantee that
a positive θ∗ < 1 such that pL(θ∗) = 0. Of course, this distribution has an unbounded support,
but apart from the fact that there is distortion at the top both under the merged and the cen-
tralized cases, all our previous results go through. Assume that the cost function is now given by
C(p) = p
2
2 on
£
0, 12
¤
and ∞ otherwise so that the condition of Lemma 1 holds.
With these functional forms, the overall cost of extracting income using a monitoring schedule
p (θ) can be written as follows:
ω(p) =
Z ∞
θ
µ
2C(p(θ)) +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(1− p(θ))2
¶
f(θ)dθ, (26)
=
Z ∞
θ
µ
p2(θ) +
(1− p(θ))2
2
¶
2e−2(θ−θ)dθ,
where the hazard rate 1−F (θ)f(θ) =
1
2 for the exponential distribution. Point-wise minimization of
expression (26) yields the cooperative solution,
C 0(pm(θ)) =
1
2
(1− pm(θ)), for all θ,
which for this example is pm(θ) = 13 , and yields an expected cost ω(p
m) = 13 .
From (13), under centralized monitoring, the monitoring intensity by either principal is given
by
C 0(pc(θ)) = 1− pc(θ), for all θ ≥ θ,
i.e., pc(θ) = 12 , with an expected cost ω(p
c) = 38 which is of course greater than
1
3 .
From (40) in the Appendix, under decentralized monitoring, an equilibrium schedule pd(θ) ≥ 0
solves the following differential equation:
θ úpd(θ)
1− pd(θ) =
1−θ
2 − p
d(θ)
1−pd(θ)
1− pd(θ)
1−pd(θ)
with the initial conditions pd(θ) in [pL(θ), 12 ], where pL (θ) is obtained as in Section 7.4.3 by setting
the numerator to zero on the right hand side of the above expression. We therefore have,
pL(θ) = max
½
0,
1− θ
3− θ
¾
.
The nonlinearity of this differential equation makes it impossible to solve explicitly for the equilib-
rium schedules. Therefore, we use numerical methods to compute the solution pd (θ) for θ = 0.0001
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and pd (θ) = 13 . Then we use this p
d (θ) to calculate the implementation cost to show that w (p∗)
is strictly smaller than ω(pc) = 38 .
24 Of course, this strict inequality still holds for θ small enough
for any equilibrium under decentralized monitoring which has an initial value pd(θ) in [pL(θ), 13 ].
Decentralized monitoring is thus preferred for a distribution of proÞts putting enough weight on
low levels of proÞt.
Let us turn to the case where θ is close to 1 from below. We then have θ∗ close to θ and
pL(θ) close to 0 everywhere. Take an equilibrium schedule pd(θ) under decentralized monitoring
with an initial value pd(θ) close to pL(θ). Such solution remains close to zero everywhere and thus
ω(pd) ≈ 12 > ω(pc). Centralized monitoring performs better than the decentralized arrangement.
The intuition is now the reverse image of the above case; as the distribution of proÞt puts enough
weight on higher levels of proÞt, centralized monitoring comes closer to the cooperative outcome.
Even with this simple example, the overall picture is quite mixed although it reßects our initial
intuition. First, there is incentive to monitor too much in the centralized case, and to monitor
too little in the decentralized case due to free riding; second, the former effect is more relevant for
low proÞts while the latter dominates for high proÞts. We constructed an example to show that
if the distribution of proÞts puts enough weight on low proÞts, decentralized monitoring will be
preferred by the principals, while the opposite is true if the distribution puts enough weight on
high proÞts. In general, comparisons between the two non-cooperative arrangements depend in
subtle ways on the proÞt distribution.
6 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of multiple principals attempting to obtain income from a pri-
vately informed agent and designing their respective Þnancial contracts non-cooperatively. A
contribution of our analysis is to note that information problems between the monitors can affect
Þnancial contracts. The degree of coordination between these principals, stemming from the ob-
servability of their monitoring efforts, has strong implications for the shapes of Þnancial contracts.
Equity is more useful when there are few information problems between principals and monitor-
ing can be credibly delegated or centralized. This is more likely to happen in publicly-traded
companies where there are rules to guarantee a coordinated access to proÞts. When instead the
idiosyncratic nature of the activity Þnanced (e.g. in privately held companies) makes it impossible
to rely on a common set of monitoring rules and forces the principals to monitor independently,
free riding will render monitoring so costly to make it convenient to use debt-like payments where
high levels of income are not monitored at all. Our Þnding is consistent with a well known result
24The calculated w(p∗) is smaller than 0.35563. It was derived using the software Mathcad and the details are
available from the authors upon request.
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from the corporate Þnance literature (see for example the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991))
according to which debt is more likely used than equity in situations with information problems.
This is because debt is relatively insensitive to Þrm performance and is likely to be priced more
accurately than equity in situations involving asymmetric information.
Our analysis could be extended along several lines. First, we have abstracted from any moral
hazard issues by assuming that the size of proÞt is exogenous and not affected by any effort from
the agent. Those considerations would lead to more complex modelling issues where principals
have a common interest in inducing the agent to exert effort. The common agency equilibrium
would highlight not only the features described here but also would exhibit some free riding
between the principals in providing the agent correct incentives to exert effort as in pure common
agency environments with moral hazard.25 One may guess that this added scope for free riding
will reduce the agents effort and thus his proÞt, making monitoring by the principals less of an
issue.
Second, a natural extension of our framework should account for some asymmetry between
the principals who could differ in terms of their cost of monitoring or according to the dates at
which they contract with the agent. Asymmetry could be useful in explaining how the degree
of monitoring performed by different principals is linked to their priority in contracting with the
agent.
Third, by focusing directly on monitoring to prevent proÞt hiding, rather than on the veriÞ-
cation of the state of nature as in the CSV approach we are able to put at the forefront one of
the central issues of the corporate governance literature; namely, how to induce informed insiders
to pay out to outsiders. The literature on monitoring in Þnancial contracts was pioneered by the
CSV approach, but recent emphasis (see Pagano and Röell (1998) and references therein) has
moved towards monitoring to prevent diversion of realized proÞt by managers, which we have
employed. In the CSV approach, the realized state of nature is veriÞed when monitoring occurs,
whereas in the current approach, monitoring limits proÞt hiding but the true state of nature is not
observed. A well known drawback of the CSV approach is that this model of monitoring is mainly
interpreted to be consistent with bankruptcies, while the newer approach can be applied to model
ongoing monitoring activity in healthy enterprises.26 However, it is possible to relate our Þrst two
models directly to the CSV approach and the outcomes would be identical. We would only need
to specify the contract differently. If we interpret q as the probability of an audit that reveals
true income, then we can specify a repayment function r(q) when there is no audit. Then our
25See Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
26See Hart (1995) for a critique of the CSV approach. He also observes that the audit costs implied by the CSV
approach may be too large to be consistent with observed bankruptcy costs.
26
repayment function t(q) = (1− q)r(q) is interpreted as the payment unconditional on an audit.27
Fourth, we could also extend the number of principals involved. As this number increases,
the various effects stressed in the paper are exacerbated. In the case of centralized monitoring,
the intensity of monitoring increases quickly with this number, making repayment a less useful
screening tool when principals are dispersed but remain strategic. As far as decentralized
contracting is concerned, free riding is more of a problem as the number of principals increases.
One might expect that principals will behave more myopically in such environments and that the
no-monitoring regions would be enhanced.
Finally, although our focus has been on Þnancial contracting, this framework can be used to
analyze other instances in which several principals monitor a common agent, like in labor contexts,
banking supervision, consumer credit, development aid agencies, tax authorities, etc. Since tax
collection also involves extracting income from an informed agent, our model can also be used to
analyze the issues of competition between tax jurisdictions. Our analysis shows that tax collection
by different jurisdictions depend on their ability to coordinate both the tax schedules and their
collection efforts, an issue often neglected in the discussions over the harmonization of taxation
across countries. More generally ours is an example of an agency problem with multiple con-
stituencies. The strategic interactions between them shape the governance arrangements between
the various stakeholders of a Þrm as well as some of the institutional mechanisms that society
develops to monitor individuals.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 If C 00(pk) >
C0(pk)
(1−pk) , then there exists a unique solution to the problem (P
C), with
C(q) = 2C
¡
1−√1− q¢ , and C(q) strictly convex with C 0 (0) = 0, and C 00 (0) > 0.
Proof
Use the constraint to replace p2 in the maximand
min
p1
C(p1) + C
µ
q − p1
1− p1
¶
.
Then differentiating w.r.t. p1 yields the FOC (after replacing p2)
(1− p1)C 0 (p1) = (1− p2)C 0 (p2) .
27Our model of decentralized monitoring is not amenable to an interpretation of a CSV model because the q
depends on both principals efforts p1 and p2, so that r(·) would become a function of the unveriÞed effort of the
other principal.
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If C 00(pk) >
C0(pk)
(1−pk) , the expression (1− pk)C 0 (pk) is increasing in pk and the maximand is quasi-
convex. Therefore we have a unique symmetric solution where p∗1 = p∗2 = 1−
√
1− q and C (q) =
2C
¡
1−√1− q¢ . Also, note that C(·) is convex
C 0(q) =
1√
1− qC
0(1−
p
1− q),
and
C 00(q) =
C 0(1−√1− q)
2(1− q) 32
+
C 00(1−√1− q)
2(1− q) > 0,
with C 0 (0) = 2C 0(0) = 0, and C 00 (0) = 2C 00(0) > 0.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We reproduce the principals problem:
max
{q(·),t(·)}
Z θ¯
θ
f (θ)
³
− C (q (θ)) + θq (θ) + t (q (θ))
´
dθ (Pm)
s.t. (3), (4), (5) and (6).
As it is standard in the principal-agent literature, we will Þrst neglect the constraint (6) and check
later that it is satisÞed by our solution. Using the incentive constraint (5), direct integration
yields
U(θ) = U(θ) +
Z θ
θ
(1− q(x))dx,
and thus, taking expectations,Z θ¯
θ
U(θ)f(θ)dθ = U(θ) +
Z θ¯
θ
(1− q(θ))(1− F (θ)dθ, (27)
where the Þnal equality is derived using integration by parts.
Standard arguments show that the principals payoff is maximized when U(θ) = 0. Using
(3) to replace t(·) in the principals objective function and using (27), we can Þnally simplify the
principals problem (Pm) to obtain:
max
q(·)
Z θ¯
θ
µ
− C(q(θ)) + θ − (1− q(θ))
µ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¶¶
f (θ) dθ. (28)
By lemma 1, we have C(·) convex so that the principals problem is concave. Point-wise
optimization of this maximand yields the Þrst-order condition (8) :
C 0(qm(θ)) =
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
,
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giving the optimal monitoring effort for each θ.
Note that our Inada assumptions on the cost function implies that q is positive for all types
except the highest proÞt one θ¯, and 0 < q < 1 for all other types. Since 1−F (θ)f(θ) is non-increasing
and C 00(q) > 0, the monotonicity condition (6) is satisÞed by qm(θ).
The total payment from the agent to the principal is qm(θ)θ + tm(q(θ)), and we show below
that it is increasing and concave in θ. Since the agents information rent for each θ is:
Um(θ) =
Z θ¯
θ
(1− qm(x))dx,
from (3) and (5) the total payment, denoted by Rm(θ), is given by
Rm(θ) = qm(θ)θ + tm(q(θ)) = θ − Um(θ),
which implies that úR(θ) = 1 − úUm(θ) = qm(θ) ≥ 0, and that úR(θ) is non-increasing in θ since
úqm(θ) ≤ 0.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
To Þnd P1s best response to P2s contract, we need to solve the following problem, denoted
thereafter by (P c1 ) :
max
{q(·),t1(·)}
Z θ¯
θ
f (θ)
Ã
−
C (q (θ))
2
+
θ
2
q (θ) + t1 (q (θ))
!
dθ (Pc1)
s.t. (11), (4), (5) and (6).
It should be clear that problem (Pc1) is quite similar to problem (Pm) modulo the fact that P1
has now no control on tc2(·). Ignoring (6) for now and proceeding as in the case of the merged
principals, we can reduce the problem (Pc1) to
max
q(·)
Z θ¯
θ
Ã
−
C(q(θ))
2
− θq (θ)
2
+ θ − tc2(q(θ))− (1− q(θ))
µ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¶!
f (θ) dθ. (29)
Let us suppose that tc2(q) is convex in q so that principal 1s problem is concave. We will check
ex post that this concavity property is satisÞed. Point-wise optimization of this maximand yields
the corresponding collective effort that P1 would like to implement in a best response to tc2(·):
1
2
C 0(q(θ)) = −θ
2
− tc02 (q(θ)) +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
. (30)
Next we characterize the equilibrium monitoring effort q(·) and argue that we have a symmetric
equilibrium in the contracts. Following similar steps as in the case for P1, we can indeed derive
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the best response for P2 to a given t1(·), which is symmetric to P1s best response. Then using
the two best responses and the agents Þrst-order condition (12), we characterize the equilibrium
monitoring effort, which is presented in the condition (13):
C 0(qc(θ)) = 2
µ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¶
.
As in the cooperative case, the monotonicity of the hazard rate implies that qc(θ) is non-increasing
as required by the condition (6).
The principals best responses imply that the equilibrium transfers are symmetric since the
outcome qc(θ) is unique and tck(q
c(θ)) = θ(1− qc(θ)), for k = 1, 2.
Immediate comparison of (8) with (13) shows that there is excessive monitoring effort when
the principals compete in contracts even though monitoring efforts are coordinated in each case:
qc(θ) > qm(θ) for all θ
except for the highest proÞt level θ¯ where they are both equal to zero.
We again see that the total payment is increasing and concave in θ. First, the rent is given by
U c(qc(θ)) =
Z θ¯
θ
(1− qc(x))dx,
and from (11) and (5), the total payment, denoted by Rc(θ), is given by
Rc(θ) = qc(θ)θ + tc1(q(θ)) + t
c
2(q(θ)),
= θ − U c(θ),
= θ −
Z θ
θ
(1− qc(x))dx.
The derivative of the total payment with respect to θ is qc(θ) ≥ 0, which is non-increasing in θ. It
immediately follows from the comparison of qm (θ) and qc (θ) that total payment is higher under
centralized monitoring for all θ > θ.
Note also that, in a symmetric equilibrium, we have útc(q) = −θc2 (q) where θc(q) is the inverse
function of qc(θ). Thus, we get t¨c(q) = − úθc2 (q) > 0 and thus tc(q) is convex validating the concavity
of each principals maximization problem.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We will prove the proposition in several stages. In subsection 7.4.1, we begin by characterizing
the SOSC as indicated prior to presenting the condition (22). Then we present the principals
problem in subsection 7.4.2, compute the Þrst-order condition and obtain some results, namely:
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in any symmetric equilibrium (i) td00(·) ≥ 0, implying that the maximand in (17) is concave as
required; and (ii) ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
< 1, i.e., there is free riding. In subsection 7.4.3 we characterize the set
of symmetric solutions pd(θ) and show that (i) the ignored conditions (22) are satisÞed, (ii) that
pc(θ) > pd(θ) for θ ∈ (θ, θ¯), and (iii) for each solution pd(θ), there exists a θ < θ¯ such that there
will be no monitoring for θ > θ. Then we study more precisely the issue of the corner at zero in
subsection 7.4.4, before moving on and checking in subsection 7.4.5 that local incentive constraints
imply global incentive compatibility. The issue there is that the single-crossing property depends
on p∗2(·), which is endogenous in this common agency environment, but strategic complementarity
of the principals efforts ensures that we do not encounter any problem. Finally, we demonstrate
that the total payment functions are indeed concave as claimed.
7.4.1 Condition SOSC (22)
Given the other principals contract t2(p2), there is no loss of generality in applying the Revelation
Principle to compute P1s best response in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium between the princi-
pals.28 We will thus construct the best response (t1(θ), p1(θ)) in terms of a direct mechanism. In
equilibrium, we will show that p1(θ) is invertible when p1(θ) > 0, using which we will associate to
this direct mechanism a nonlinear schedule t1(p1).
Focusing on the direct mechanism (t1(θ), p1(θ)) for the moment, standard arguments imply
that the local FOC for the agents problem writes as:
út1(θ) + úp1(θ)vp(θ, p1(θ)) = 0 for all θ. (31)
The corresponding SOSC associated to the agents problem is given by:
úp1(θ)
∙
1− p∗2(p1(θ), θ) + (1− p1(θ))
∂p∗2
∂p1
(p1(θ), θ)
¸
≤ 0,
which immediately implies (22) since ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
> 0.
7.4.2 P1s problem:
Let us describe P1s problem with decentralized monitoring, denoted by P d1 :
max
{p1(.),t1(.)}
Z θ¯
θ
f (θ) [−C (p1 (θ)) + θ
2
(1− (1− p1(θ)) (1− p∗2 (p1 (θ) , θ))) + t1 (p1(θ))]dθ (Pd1 )
s.t. (4) , (17) , (18) , (20) , (21) , and (22).
28See Martimort and Stole (2002) for this argument.
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It is again optimal to set U(θ) = 0, and then from (21) , we can integrate to obtain
U (θ) =
Z θ
θ
(1− p1 (x)) (1− p∗2 (p1, x)) dx. (32)
We will ignore condition (22) for now and show later that it is indeed satisÞed by the equilibrium
schedule. After using the indirect utility function (20) to substitute t1(·), we can substitute U(θ)
using (32) to simplify the problem to
max
p1(.)
Z θ¯
θ
f (θ) [−C (p1 (θ)) + θ
2
+ (1− p1) (1− p∗2 (p1 (θ) , θ))
µ
θ
2
− 1− F (θ)
f (θ)
¶
−td2 (p∗2 (p1 (θ) , θ))]dθ
s.t. p∗2 (p1 (θ) , θ) satisÞes (18) .
In the remainder of the proof, we suppress θ where obvious. Assuming that C(·) is convex enough
to ensure concavity of the principals problem, point-wise optimization yields the following Þrst-
order condition for the optimal p1(θ), denoted by pd1(θ), when it is interior (i.e., p
d
1 ∈ (0, 1)),
C 0
³
pd1
´
=
³
1− p∗2(pd1, θ)
´µ1− F
f
− θ
2
¶
−∂p
∗
2
∂p1
(pd1, θ)
∙³
1− pd1
´µθ
2
− 1− F
f
¶
+ td02
³
p∗2(p
d
1, θ)
´¸
, (33)
where ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
(pd1, θ) can be obtained from (18) when p
∗
2(p
d
1, θ) > 0:
∂p∗2
∂p1
=
θ
td002 (p∗2 (p1, θ))
. (34)
Using this expression, we obtain:
C 0
³
pd1 (θ)
´
= (1− p∗2)
µ
1− F
f
− θ
2
¶
+
θ
td002 (p∗2)
(1− p1)
µ
θ
2
+
1− F
f
¶
. (35)
Let us look for a symmetric equilibrium with td (·) = td1 (·) = td2 (·) and pd(·) = pd1(·) = pd2(·). For
θ such that pd(θ) > 0 and p∗2(pd1 (θ) θ) = pd(θ), (35) becomes
C 0
³
pd
´
=
³
1− pd
´µ1− F
f
− θ
2
+
θ
td00 (pd)
µ
θ
2
+
1− F (θ)
f (θ)
¶¶
. (36)
Using (18) we have for all θ, where pd(θ) > 0,
θ
³
1− pd (θ)
´
= −td0
³
pd (θ)
´
, (37)
which after differentiation w.r.t. θ yields
1− pd − θ úpd = −td00
³
pd
´
úpd,
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or
θ
td00 (pd)
= − θ úp
d
1− pd − úpdθ . (38)
Since úpd(θ) ≤ 0, as required by the local SOSC (22), the above expression establishes two results:
(i) td00(·) ≥ 0, and using (34) , (ii) ∂p∗2∂p1 < 1.
Hence, replacing td00(·) into (36) using (38), yields the following differential equation satisÞed
by a symmetric equilibrium at all points θ where pd(θ) > 0.
C 0
³
pd
´
=
³
1− pd
´µ1− F
f
− θ
2
− θ úp
d
1− pd − úpdθ
µ
θ
2
+
1− F
f
¶¶
. (39)
A priori, the solution to this differential equation, denoted by s(θ), does not need to remain
positive (as is required for pd(θ)). Hence we use the different notation to distinguish s(θ) from the
equilibrium schedule pd(θ).We intend to prove that pd (θ) = max {s(θ), 0} . To deÞne the solutions
to this differential equation for all values of θ, we will extend C (s) for s < 0. The continuously
differentiable extension C (s) = 0 for s < 0 does the job. Once a solution, denoted by s(θ), to this
differential equation is obtained, it cannot be positive again once it touches zero since it is weakly
decreasing. We then have to check that pd (θ) = max {s(θ), 0}, i.e., there is a corner at zero in the
optimum of the principals objective.
First, note that (39) can be also written as
θ úsd
1− s =
(1− s)
³
1−F
f − θ2
´
− C 0 (s)
2 (1− s)
³
1−F
f
´
− C 0 (s)
. (40)
Let us now analyze the properties of s (θ) , the solutions to (40) .
Note Þrst that the initial value s (θ) is not deÞned a priori. The initial value s (θ) is thus
chosen to guarantee that the whole schedule s (θ) satisÞes the local SOSC.
7.4.3 Comparative Statics
See Figure 2 for this. Let us note that the numerator (resp. denominator) of the RHS above is
equal to zero for pL(θ) (resp. pc(θ)), where pL(θ) is deÞned in (25) . Note that pc(θ) is deÞned
for all θ ∈ £θ, θ¯¤ . Instead, pL (θ) is strictly positive only for θ ∈ [θ, θ∗] , where θ∗ is deÞned by
(15) , and there exists a unique θ∗ ∈ ¡θ, θ¯¢. Both pc(θ) and pL(θ) are decreasing with θ and that
pc(θ) > pL(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ¯). From (40), s(θ) is non-increasing as long as s(θ) remains in the
interval [pL(θ), pc(θ)] .
Let us take s(θ) ∈ [pL(θ), pc(θ)] and consider the solution to (40) with this initial value. We
claim that such a solution is strictly decreasing and always remains within (pL(θ), pc(θ)) . Indeed,
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if it crosses pL(θ) at any θ1 ∈ (θ, θ∗) for the Þrst time, we should have ús(θ1) = 0, but then
s(θ) < pL(θ) for θ ∈ (θ1 − ε, θ1) for ε small enough; a contradiction.
If s(θ) crosses pc(θ) at any θ2 ∈
¡
θ, θ¯
¢
for the Þrst time, we should have ús(θ2) =∞, but then
s(θ) > pc(θ) for θ2 ∈ (θ2, θ2 + ε) for ε small enough; a contradiction since the trajectories do not
go through θ¯.
Since all initial values s(θ) in [pL(θ), pc(θ)] correspond to possible solutions to (40), all these
solutions are equilibria as long as s(θ) ≥ 0, i.e., are on an interval
h
θ, θ
i
, where θ is deÞned by
s(θ) = 0 for any given s(·) and θ < θ¯. These schedules correspond to equilibria which can be
ranked from low to high depending on their initial value pd(θ).
7.4.4 Corner at zero
Let us now tackle more precisely the issue of the corner at zero. So far indeed, we have implicitly
assumed that P1 only induces the agent, whatever his proÞt level θ, to choose a positive monitoring
intensity p∗2(p1, θ) from P2 . We must investigate what happens when P1 chooses to induce
p∗2(p1, θ) = 0.
Indeed, take any supposed equilibrium pd(θ). For θ > θ we have pd(θ) = 0 and when, say P1,
deviates and makes an alternative offer to the common agent, he may want to have the agent
choose p∗2(p1, θ) = 0. Note that this occurs when
−θ (1− p1) ≤ td0(0) = −θ,
where the equality follows from the deÞnition of θ and continuity of td
0
(·) at θ. Hence, such
deviation occurs as long as p1 ≤ 1− θθ . For θ < θ, there is no such deviation with p1 > 0 inducing
the agent to choose p∗2(p1, θ) = 0. For θ ≥ θ instead, there are such deviations. Over the interval
of p1 in
h
θ, 1− θθ
i
, P1s marginal payoff at θ is
−C 0(p1) + 1− F
f
− θ
2
< 0
because θ ≥ θ ≥ θ∗ . Hence, P1s optimal choice on the set is p1 = 0.
For p1 in the interval
h
1− θθ , 1
i
, P1s marginal payoff at θ is
−C 0(p1) + (1− p∗2(p1, θ))
µ
1− F
f
− θ
2
¶
− ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
(p1, θ)
µ
(1− p1)
µ
θ
2
− 1− F
f
¶
+ td0(p∗2(p1, θ)
¶
.
We know that this expression is zero at p1 = s(θ). Thus, by concavity of P1s payoff, the expression
above is negative at p1 = 1− θθ . Since P1s payoff is continuous at p1 = 1−
θ
θ , we can deduce that
P1s payoff is maximum at p1 = 0 for all θ ≥ θ.
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7.4.5 Global concavity
To ensure global concavity of the agents problem, let us write
∆ = v(pd(θ), θ)− td(θ)−
h
v(pd(θ1), θ)− td(θ1)
i
,
where
v(pd(θ1), θ) = max
p2
n
θ
³
1− pd(θ1)
´
(1− p2)− td(p2)
o
and let us show that ∆ ≥ 0 for all (θ, θ1) in [θ, θ¯]× [θ, θ¯].
Using the FOC of the agents problem (31), we have:
∆ = v(pd(θ), θ)− v(pd(θ1), θ)−
Z θ
θ1
vp(p
d(y), y) úp(y)dy,
=
Z θ
θ1
h
vp(p
d(y), θ)− vp(pd(y), y)
i
úp(y)dy,
=
Z θ
θ1
úp(y)
µZ θ
y
vpθ(p
d(y), x)dx
¶
dy.
Since úp(y) ≤ 0, ∆ ≥ 0 when vpθ(pd(y), x) ≤ 0. But, by deÞnition,
vpθ(p
d(y), x) = −
µ³
1− pd(y)
´ ∂p∗2
∂p1
³
pd(y), x
´
+ 1− p∗2
³
pd(y), x
´¶
≤ 0,
since ∂p
∗
2
∂p1
¡
pd(y), x
¢ ≥ 0.
7.4.6 Concavity of total payment and comparison with centralized case
First, observe that total payment, denoted by Rd(θ) is given by
Rd(θ) =
∙
2pdi (θ)−
³
pdi (θ)
´2¸
θ + td(pdi (θ)) + t
d(pdi (θ))
= θ − Ud(θ).
From (21) the derivative of Rd(θ) is:∙
1−
³
1− pd(θ)
´2¸
> 0,
but then the second derivative is 2
¡
1− pd (θ)¢ úpd(θ) ≤ 0 as is required for concavity. Comparing
equilibrium monitoring efforts we immediately see that total payment is smaller under decen-
tralized monitoring compared to the centralized case for all θ > θ. This is depicted in Figure
2.
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7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove both parts of the proposition, we only need to show that the trajectories of the differential
equation (39), that characterizes pd (θ) , cross the line p = pm(θ) only once from above.
Denoting such an intersection point as θ1, and using (39), we have:
úpd(θ1)
1− pd(θ1) = −
1
21−F (θ1)f(θ1)
. (41)
Also by differentiating (10), we get:
úpm(θ1)
1− pm(θ1) =
d
dθ
³
1−F
f
´ ¯¯¯
θ1
C 00(pm(θ1)) +
1−F (θ1)
f(θ1)
. (42)
Comparing (41) and (42) at a point θ1 such that pm(θ1) = pd(θ1), we observe that 0 >
úpm(θ1) > úp
d(θ1) when ddθ
³
1−F
f
´
≥ −12 .
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Figure 1. Comparison of monitoring and total payment under 
cooperative (merged) and non-cooperative but 
centralized monitoring
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Figure 2. Comparison of total payment under centralized 
and decentralized monitoring and the set of equilibria 
under decentralized monitoring.
